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JUDGING THE SCHIAVO CASE
Samuel R. Bagenstos*
I don't share the anti-abortion politics of the most vocal
supporters of Theresa Schiavo's parents, Robert and Mary
Schindler. Nor do I agree with the intemperate attacks visited on
the courts following the rejection of the Schindlers' federal lawsuit. But I do think that the manner in which the federal courts
handled the case offers cause for regret. The federal courts
rushed the case, and in so doing, failed to provide meaningful
consideration to the Schindlers' non-frivolous claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act {ADA). The state court ordered
Schiavo's feeding and hydration terminated for reasons that had
everything to do with her medical condition-a condition that is
clearly a "disability" under the ADA. Although there may be
good arguments that the state court did not violate the statute,
the federal courts did not so much as advert to those arguments.
And the case touched on a core concern of many disability rights
advocates: the fear that non-disabled people, relying on erroneous understandings of the "quality of life" of people with disabilities, will unjustifiably terminate life-sustaining treatment.
Given that background, the federal courts should have taken the
time to give the Schindlers' ADA claim at least some serious
consideration.
It is certainly understandable that the federal judges assigned to the case wanted to rush things. By the time the case got
to federal court, the state courts had considered the matter with
care and deliberation through six years of contested litigation.
There was no particular reason to believe that the state courts
had overlooked something or that federal court intervention was
necessary. But it was not up to the federal courts to decide that
* Professor of Law, Washington University. Thanks to Susan Appleton, Mary
Crossley, Arlene Mayerson, Martha Minow, Laura Rosenbury, David Shapiro, and, as
always, Margo Schlanger for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks as well to
Nicolle Neulist for research assistance. Particularly in light of the degree to which many
of them disagree with various aspects of my argument, the usual disclaimer is especially
apt: All faults are mine.
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question. Congress had explicitly directed them to address and
resolve the Schindlers' claims de novo, notwithstanding any state
court proceedings that came before. Federal judges might understandably have been put off by the way the statute singled out a
particular case, the lack of meaningful congressional deliberation
in the highly charged atmosphere in which the statute was
adopted, and the attempts by many politicians to use the courts
(as weapons or targets) in a political battle. But neither the district judge nor any of the judges on the three-judge appellate
panel assigned to the case was willing to conclude that the statute was unconstitutional. In the absence of such a ruling, the
federal courts should have given the parties and themselves
enough time to give meaningful consideration to the Schindlers'
claims.
I. THE RUSH TO JUDGMENT
When President Bush signed Public Law 109-31 at 1:11 A.M.
on March 21, 2005, the feeding and hydration tubes had already
been removed from Theresa Schiavo pursuant to the state
court's order. For those who sought to keep Schiavo alive, time
was of the essence. The Schindlers filed their initial complaint
that morning, along with a request for a temporary restraining
order to reinsert the tubes. The district court held a hearing on
the TRO request that afternoon and denied the motion in an
opinion issued the next morning, March 22.2
It's hard to disagree with the district court's denial of the
initial request for a temporary restraining order. To be sure, the
balance of hardships clearly favored a TRO: Denial would almost certainly lead to Schiavo's death whereas granting the
TRO would merely continue, for some indefinite period of time,
the artificial feeding and hydration that Schiavo had been receiving for fifteen years. But under ordinary rules governing interlocutory relief-rules Congress pointedly did not change in Public Law 109-33 -a favorable balance of hardships is not enough.
The plaintiff must also show at least some meaningful prospect

1. Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (Mar. 21, 2005).
2 See Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
3. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam) (showing that "Congress considered and specifically rejected provisions that
would have mandated, or permitted with favorable implications, the grant of the pretrial
stay").
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of success on the merits. The claims in the first complaint were
frivolous. 4
The Schindlers immediately filed a notice of appeal, and
that same day-which was just one day after they filed their
complaint initiating the federal case- they filed an amended
complaint, containing several new causes of action, in the district
court. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the temporary
restraining order by a 2-1 panel vote on the 23rd,5 and the
Schindlers filed a renewed motion for TRO the next day, March
24. The district court held a hearing on the renewed motion that
evening, from 6:30 to 9:40 P.M., and issued its opinion denying
the motion the next morning. 6 As it had three days earlier, the
district court recognized that the balance of hardships tipped
strongly in favor of the plaintiffs, but it again found no sufficient
7
likelihood that they would succeed on the merits.
A. THE (UNAPPRECIATED) COMPLEXITY
OF THE ADA CLAIM

It is here that I think the district court slipped. Along with
several counts that were just as insubstantial as those in the
original complaint, the amended complaint included a cause of
action under the ADA.8 That claim was far from frivolous. There
is no doubt that Theresa Schiavo was an "individual with a disability" under the statute-her medical condition, which had left
her unconscious for fifteen years, clearly constituted a "physical
or mental imi?airment that substantially limit[ed]" her "major
life activities. "9 And that medical condition was the sole reason
the state courts concluded that she would not choose to receive
further feeding and hydration. 10 At least on the face of things,
4. This is not to say that the district court's analysis of those claims was without its
flaws. In rejecting the Schindlers' claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and the Free Exercise Oause of the First Amendment, the district court
rested entirely on its conclusion that the state court judge was not operating as a state
actor when he ordered the termination of Schiavo's feeding and hydration. See Schiavo,
357 F. Supp. 2d at 1388. For reasons I discuss below, see infra text accompanying notes
52-55, that conclusion was clearly wrong-and almost surely a product of the court's undue haste.
5. See Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1229.
6. See Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
7. See id. at 1163-64.
8. See id. at 1164-65.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)
10. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176,180 (Fla. 0. App. 2001)
("In the final analysis, the difficult question that faced the trial court was whether
Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo, not after a few weeks in a coma, but after ten years in
a persistent vegetative state that has robbed her of most of her cerebrum and all but the
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those facts would seem to establish that Schiavo experienced
discrimination "by reason of [her] disability" or "on the basis of
[her] disability" in violation of the ADA.11
To be sure, the issue is complicated. The Schindlers filed
their suit against three defendants: Michael Schiavo (Theresa's
husband), Judge George Greer (the state court judge who entered the order terminating feeding and hydration), and the
Hospice of Florida Suncoast (where Theresa Schiavo was living
at the time of the order). Of these three defendants, it is quite
unlikely that Michael Schiavo or the Hospice violated the ADA.
To the extent that the complaint challenged the conduct of Michael Schiavo, that conduct occurred in his capacity as an individual, private citizen-not as an employer, government entity,
or place of public accommodation, which are the types of entities
covered by the AD A. 12 The Hospice clearly is covered by the
AD A as a place of public accommodation, 13 but it seems to have
operated purely neutrally here. When the state court ordered the
tube removed, the Hospice did so, and when the state court ordered the tube reinserted, the Hospice did so. 14 The Hospice thus
appears to have acted on the basis of the state court's order, not
Schiavo's disability.15
As for Judge Greer, he was operating as a state actor at the
time he ordered that Schiavo's feeding and hydration be terminated. He, or at least the court on which he served and for which
he acted, was a "public entity" subject to the antidiscrimination
requirements of ADA Title Il. 16 But there are still a number of
most instinctive of neurological functions, with no hope of a medical cure but with sufficient money and strength of body to live indefinitely, would choose to continue the constant nursing care and the supporting tubes in hopes that a miracle would somehow recreate her missing brain tissue, or whether she would wish to permit a natural death
process to take its course and for her family members and loved ones to be free to continue their lives. After due consideration, we conclude that the trial judge had clear and
convincing evidence to answer this question as he did.").
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182(a).
12 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (public accommodation includes a "professional
office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment").
14. See Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
15. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 630 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("A hospital's withholding of treatment [from an infant with a disability) when no
parental consent has been given cannot violate§ 504 J<?f the Rehab~tation.Act): for
without the consent of the parents or a surrogate deru10nmaker the infant IS neither
'otherwise qualified' for treatment nor has he been denied care 'solely by reason of his
handicap."'). The Rehabilitation Act is the predecessor statute to the ADA, and ADA
law generally incorporates the substantive principles applied under that statute. See 42
U.S.C. § 12201(a); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,631-32 (1998).
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1), 12132.
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complications. First, one might argue that just as the Hospice
acted purely neutrally in implementing Judge Greer's order,
Judge Greer acted purely neutrally in implementing Theresa
Schiavo's wishes, as best he could determine them. Second, even
if the decision to terminate feeding and hydration can be laid at
Judge Greer's feet, a line of lower-court "Baby Doe" cases holds
that the disability discrimination laws do not apply to decisions
to withhold medical treatment-at least where the plaintiff's disability is the reason why the plaintiff needs medical treatment in
the first place. 17 These cases rest on a conclusion that Congress
never envisioned that the disability discrimination laws would
apply to medical treatment decisions/ 8 as well as on a formal discrimination principle that would suggest that Schiavo's claim
lacks merit: If her disability was the only reason Schiavo needed
a tube to provide food and hydration in the first place, then the
failure to provide her such a tube does not discriminate on the
basis of disability because there are no similarly situated nondisabled people who were provided the tube. 19 Third, even if,
notwithstanding that precedent, Judge Greer did discriminate on
the basis of disability, perhaps Schiavo was not a "qualified" individual with a disability as required for statutory protection. 20 If
a legitimate medical judgment underlay the decision to withhold
feeding and hydration, one might say that she failed to "meetO
the essential eligibility requirements" for receipt of that treatment.21
But these arguments are not obviously right. Indeed, there
are powerful (although not necessarily dispositive) answers to
17. See, e.g., Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493 (lOth Cir. 1992) ("Such a
plaintiff must prove that he or she was discriminatorily denied medical treatment because
of the birth defect and, at the same time, must prove that, in spite of the birth defect, he
or she was 'otherwise qualified' to receive the denied medical treatment. Ordinarily,
however, if such a person were not so handicapped, he or she would not need the medical
treatment and thus would not 'otherwise qualify' for the treatment."); United States v.
University Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y., 729 F.2d 144, 156 (1984) (concluding that Section
504 "cannot be applied in the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment decisions
without distorting its plain meaning" because "one would not ordinarily think of a newborn infant suffering from multiple birth defects as being 'otherwise qualified' to have
corrective surgery performed"). But see id. at 162-63 (Winter, J., dissenting) (concluding
that Section 504 does prohibit denial of medical treatment newborns need because of
their disabilities in some circumstances).
18. See University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156-59.
19. See Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1494; University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156.
20. 42 u.s.c. § 12132.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (defining "qualified individual with a disability"); see University Hosp., 729 F.Zd at 162 (Winter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Section 504 prohibits
discriminatory failure to treat newborns with disabilities but acknowledging that no discrimination exists if the refusal to treat rests on "a bona fide medical judgment").
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them. The argument that Judge Greer simply neutrally implemented Theresa Schiavo's preferences seems a bit artificial.
Judge Greer was called upon to decide what Theresa Schiavo
would have wanted.12 As the state appellate court observed, he
was called upon to do so on the basis of very little evidence: "She
had been raised in the Catholic faith, but did not regularly attend
mass or have a religious advisor who could assist the court in
weighing her religious attitudes about life-support methods. Her
statements to her friends and family about the dying process
were few and they were oral."23 It was Judge Greer's judgmentand not Theresa Schiavo's-that she would not have wanted to
continue to receive food and hydration given how severe her
medical condition was. In making that judgment, he relied not
just on Schiavo's few (somewhat conflicting) statements about
the issue, but also, at least to some extent, on general testimony
about Americans' "values, opinions, and attitudes about the decision to discontinue life-support systems." 24 Judge Greer may
well have been correct, but it was he who made the decision.
This is not to say that Judge Greer lacked the legal power to
make that decision. If we respect individuals' autonomy in refusing treatment, we need some system for determining what to do
with individuals who cannot make that choice at the time treatment decisions must be made. A regime that requires a judge to
determine what the individual would have wanted, based on the
best available evidence, could reasonably be thought to be more
respectful of autonomy than one that simply imposes a rule of
treatment or non-treatment across the board without reference
to what we know about an individual's preferences. If that is so,
then perhaps it makes sense as a legal matter to treat Judge
Greer's decision that Schiavo would not have consented to continued treatment as equivalent to a decision by Schiavo herself
to refuse treatment.
But things are not so simple. To say that a state judge can
insulate from review a decision to withhold a patient's treatment
simply by deciding that the patient would have wanted to with22 See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003)
("[T)he trial judge must make a decision that the clear and convincing evidence shows
the ward would have made for herself.").
23. Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 180.
24. Id. at 179; see Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, slip op. 9-10 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 2000) ("[A)s Ms. Tyler noted when she testified as to quality of life being the
primary criteria [sic) in artificial life support matters, Americans want to 'try it ~o_r
awhile' but they do not wish to live on it with no hope of improvement. That unplictt
condition has long since been satisfied in this case.").
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hold treatment begs the question. The decision about what the
patient would have wanted may well be influenced by (perhaps
unconscious) bias against disability. It is commonplace that nondisabled people entertain much more negative views about the
quality and desirability of living life with a disability than do
people with disabilities themselves. 25 If a state judge, in the
course of deciding what an incompetent patient "would have
wanted," relies on such biased assessments, it is reasonable to
treat the judge's decision as itself discriminatory. Such a decision
calls for scrutiny under the disability discrimination laws, and a
judge ought not be able to shield his or her decision from such
scrutiny simply by deeming the decision to be an exercise of the
incompetent patient's choice.
The argument based on the "Baby Doe" cases is also problematic for at least two reasons. First, the "Baby Doe" cases
have been substantially undermined by more recent Supreme
Court decisions. In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v.
Yeskey, 26 the Court emphatically rejected the notion-which was
central to the "Baby Doe" cases-that the ADA applies only to
those contexts expressly anticipated by Congress. The ADA's
broad language extends without limitation to any disabilitybased discrimination by any "public entity," 27 and Yeskey accords the statute a correspondingly broad sweep. 28 Whether or
not Congress specifically intended to apply the ADA to medical
treatment decisions by public entities, the statute, after Yeskey,
clearly does apply to those decisions.
It is also doubtful that the formal discrimination analysis of
the "Baby Doe" cases survives the Supreme Court's decision in
Olmstead v. L.C.29 In Olmstead, the Court held that discrimination on the basis of disability includes the unnecessary placement
in institutional settings, rather than community settings, of individuals with disabilities who receive state mental health care.
The state argued that its failure to create community placements
25. See, e.g., Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disabilities, and Assisted Suicide:
An Examination of Relevant Empirical Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6 PsYCHOL., PuB.
POL'Y & L. 526, 528-30 (2000) (summarizing empirical evidence on this question).
26. 524 u.s. 206 (1998).
27. 42 u.s.c. § 12132.
28. See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212 (holding that, even if "Congress did not envision
that the ADA would be applied to state prisoners," the statute still applied to them because "the fact that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by
Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity" but instead "demonstrates breadth") (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
29. 527 u.s. 581 (1999).

464

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 22:457

for people with mental illness could not constitute "discrimination" on the basis of disability because it did not provide community-based treatment to individuals who lacked disabilities.30
But the Court rejected that argument and concluded that "Congress had a more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination advanced in the ADA." 31 If the failure to provide appropriate community-based treatment to people with disabilities
constitutes "discrimination" -even when the disabilities are the
reason treatment is needed in the first place and even when
community-based treatment is not provided to people without
disabilities-the "Baby Doe" holding that the ADA does not
apply to medical treatment decisions stands on very shaky
ground. 32
Second, even if the formal discrimination analysis of the
"Baby Doe" cases were still good law, there seems to be a clear
instance of formal discrimination here. The court ordered withdrawal of the feeding and hydration tubes because of the severity of Theresa Schiavo's medical condition. If she had needed
those tubes only temporarily, because of a passing, non-disabling
condition, Judge Greer would not have ordered that the tubes be
withdrawn. 33 It was the disabling nature of Schiavo's condition
that tilted the balance.
The "qualified individual" issue was in some ways the most
difficult for the Schindlers. It's clear that a doctor can take a patient's medical condition into account in making a medical decision; that's the essence of a doctor's job. And there's no reason
why things should be different when the patient's medical condition constitutes a "disability" under the ADA. If a condition that
constitutes a "disability" can be mitigated or cured most effectively by a different treatment than that administered for a different, non-"disabling" condition, it would not make sense to say
that the doctor must ignore the disability and provide the less effective treatment. Still, the Schiavo case does not quite fit that
paradigm. There seems no doubt that continued feeding and hydration would have kept Theresa Schiavo alive. The only question was essentially a normative one: Did it make sense, given
30. See id. at 598.
31. /d.
32. For further criticism of the analysis of the "Baby Doe" cases, see, for example,
Philip G. Peters, Jr., When Physicians Balk at Futile Care: Implications of the Disability
Rights Laws, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 798, 81S-25 (1997).
33. See Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, slip op. 8 (noting that Florida law prohibits exercise of substitute judgment if the patient has "a reasonable probability of recovering competency") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the persistent vegetative state in which Schiavo was living and
the lack of any realistic prospect of improvement, to keep her
alive? Disability rights advocates have long argued, with considerable force, that such quality-of-life judgments often reflect an
irrational bias against people with disabilities and an assumption
that lives with disabilities are less worthwhile.34 When, as in the
Schiavo case, disability-related quality-of-life concerns drive a
decision to withhold a treatment that would clearly be effective
in its narrow medical objective, it does not seem at all a stretch
to find a violation of the ADA. 35
None of this is to say that the ADA claim was obviously
meritorious. The arguments discussed above su~est, to the contrary, that the case was a close one either way. In particular, it
seems unlikely that the statute would be held to require a state
to keep alive a person who has lost all consciousness and cognition and who has no prospect of regaining them.37 But one phenomenon to which the ADA responds is the tendency to believe
that disabilities are more limiting than they in fact are. 38 In the
medical context, that tendency has frequently manifested itself
in physicians' decisions to withhold treatment based on unduly
negative predictions about the quality and length of disabled
persons' lives.39 Against that backdrop, it is quite plausible to
read the ADA as demanding a skeptical review of a claim that
an individual's disability makes treatment futile. It should thus
34. See, e.g., Gill, supra note 25, passim. This point was a major theme of some disability-rights oriented commentary on the Schiavo case. See, e.g., Harriet McBryde Johnson, Not Dead at All: Why Congress was Right to Stick Up for Te"i Schiavo, SLATE, Mar.
23, 2005, available at http:l/slate.msn.com/id/2115208. For general discussions of the
problem see, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as
Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1479, 1507-08 (2001); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health
Care Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 491, 501 (1995).
35. For a discussion of relevant legal arguments, see Mary A. Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discrimination, 81 IOWA L. REv. 179, 220-26 (1995); see also Einer
Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1449, 1514-15 (1994) (arguing,
from a normative rather than a doctrinal perspective, that wrongful discrimination exists
in the refusal to give a medical treatment to an individual because that individual has a
condition that is not the target of the treatment).
36. Cf. Crossley, supra note 35, at 182 (finding "inconclusiveO" the legal arguments
regarding whether it violates the disability discrimination laws to withhold treatment
from an individual with a disability based on medical futility).
37. For an argument that the disability discrimination laws should not be read to
impose any such requirement, see Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1092-95 (1997).
38. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA.
L. REV. 397, 438 (2000).
39. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CiviL RIGIITS, MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
CHILDREN WITII DISABILITIES (1989); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CiviL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 273-79 (1993).

466

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 22:457

have been significant to the federal courts that the Schindlers
vigorously contested Schiavo's persistent-vegetative-state diagnosis. As I discuss below, however, those courts did not even address that factual dispute.
B. UNDUE HASTE
The issues, then, were complicated. But the federal courts
did not appear even to notice any of these complexities. Rather,
just three days after the Schindlers filed the amended complaint
that contained the ADA claim, and just one day after the
Schindlers filed their renewed TRO motion in light of that and
the other new claims, the district court ruled that there was no
realistic likelihood of success.40 Given the speed with which it
rendered its opinion, it is not surprising that the district court
made some obvious mistakes. The court simply ignored the fact
that the Schindlers had named Judge Greer as a defendant in the
ADA claim; it discussed the potential liability of only Michael
Schiavo and the Hospice. 41 And in rejecting the possibility that
the Hospice might be liable, the court ruled that the ADA's
"public accommodation" definition "does not include a facility
such as Hospice. "42 That ruling disregards the statutory language,
which states that a "public accommodation" includes a "professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service
establishment. "43
But more important than these mistakes, which are sure
signs of a rush job, the district court did not seem at all to understand the complex issues raised by the ADA claim. The court
held that "Theresa Schiavo is not 'otherwise qualified' because
she would not have any need for a feeding tube to deliver nutrition and hydration but for her medical condition. "44 It relied
solely on two pre-Yeskey, pre-Olmstead cases-the leading
"Baby Doe" case of United States v. University Hospital of State
University of New York at Stony Brook45 and a subsequent Seventh Circuit decision that itself relied almost entirely on Univer-

40. See Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1164-65.
41. See id.
42 Id. at 1165.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
44. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1166. This quote appears in the portion of the dis·
trict court's opinion that addresses the claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
but the analysis applies equally well to the ADA claim.
45. 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984).
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sity Hospital and another "Baby Doe" case46 -which held that
the disability discrimination laws "cannot be meaningfully applied to a medical treatment decision. "47 The court cited
Olmstead-ironically, for the proposition that the disability discrimination laws "do[] not mandate the provision of services"48 but it did not even begin to recognize that Olmstead's holding
might undercut the "Baby Doe" cases on which it placed such
heavy reliance. The Court did not mention Yeskey at all.
Later on March 25- the same day the district court ruledthe Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the renewed motion
for a TR0.49 The court of appeals corrected some of the district
court's errors: Unlike the district court, it acknowledged that the
Schindlers had named Judge Greer a defendant on their ADA
claim,50 and it did not repeat the district court's erroneous conclusion that the Hospice was not a "public accommodation."51
But the court of appeals introduced errors of its own. Most notably, the court held that Judge Greer was not operating as a
state actor when, acting in his official capacity, he ordered the
termination of feeding and hydration to Theresa Schiavo.52 That
holding seems, on its face, to be inconsistent with Shelley v.
Kraemer. 53 The court of appeals relied on an earlier Eleventh
Circuit case that had held that a state judge does not commit
unlawful state action merely by entertaining a suit that one private party brought for unlawful purposes against another private
party. 54 But that earlier case had expressly recognized that state
action should be "found after a final judgment or otherwise dispositive order on the merits had been rendered by the state
court"55 -the precise fact setting of the Schiavo case.
Moreover, in affirming the district court's denial of the renewed motion for a TRO the Eleventh Circuit uncritically relied

46. Grzan v. Chaner Hosp., 104 F.3d 116, 121-22 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing University
Hosp., supra; Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493-94 (lOth Cir. 1992), cen. denied,
5fJ7 u.s. 910 (1993)).
47. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
49. See Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
50. See id. at 1293 n.2.
51. See id. at 1293-94 (assuming arguendo that the Hospice was a "public accommodation").
52 See id. at 1293 n.2.
53. 334 u.s. 1 (1948).
54. See Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1293 n.2 (citing Paisley v. Vitale, 8fJ7 F.2d 889, 893-94
(11th Cir. 1986) ).
55. Paisley, 8(]7 F.2d at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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on the "Baby Doe" cases to rule that the disability discrimination laws were "never intended to apply to decisions involving
the termination of life support or medical treatment. "56 Like the
district court, the court of appeals did not appear to recognize
that Olmstead or Yeskey might undermine the continuing force
of those cases. Indeed, unlike the district court, the court of appeals never even cited Olmstead.
The March 25 decision was the Eleventh Circuit's last word
on the merits of the Schiavo appeal. The court denied en bane
rehearing five days later. 57 It did so over the dissent of Judge
Tjoflat, joined by Judge Wilson, who warned that "the hurried
pace of this litigation" had prevented the court from "giv[ingJ
the plaintiffs' claims the reasoned attention they deserve."
Theresa Schiavo died the next day, March 31.
Significantly, the federal courts never addressed the crucial
factual question regarding the extent of Schiavo's impairment.
Although the Florida courts concluded that Schiavo was in a
persistent vegetative state,59 and Schiavo's subsequent autopsy
seems clearly to confirm that conclusion,60 the accelerated proceedings prevented the federal courts from conducting their own
de novo review of that question as Public Law 109-3 required. 61
Indeed, the district court did not discuss the issue at all, nor did
the appellate panel. The two judges in the panel majority did
briefly discuss the facts in their concurrence in the denial of rehearing en bane, but they addressed only the question of what
Schiavo would have wanted; they did not address the medical
dispute. Even so, the judges pointedly declined to engage in de
novo review of the state court findings: "Given the credibility
determinations that the state trial court was authorized to and
did make, the evidence clearly was sufficient to meet the clear
and convincing evidence standard, which the Florida courts had
62
imposed and did apply in this case. "

56. Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1294 (citing University Hosp., supra; Johnson, supra). The
court also relied on Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Qr. 1996), a pre-Yeskey,
pre-Olmstead case that held that the ADA is not "violated by a prison's simply failing to
attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners."
57. See Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2005).
58. Id. at 1279 (fjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
59. See Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d at 185, 186.
60. See, e.g., John-Thor Dahlburg & Karen Kaplan, Autopsy Says Schiavo was
Oblivious to Surroundings, L.A. TIMEs, June 16, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 9518169.
61. See Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2.
62 Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1279 (Carnes and Hull, JJ., concurring in denial ofrehearing en bane).
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II. WHYTHERUSH?
The ADA claim was before the federal courts for a total of
three days before those courts issued their dispositive opinions.
And the district court and the three-judge appellate panel each
entertained the TRO request involving that claim for only a matter of hours. Although the issues were complex and contested,
the federal courts felt sufficiently confident that the claim had no
merit that they refused to issue even a brief temporary restraining order to keep Theresa Schiavo alive while they considered it.
As I have shown, their haste led to some obvious errors, and the
federal courts failed to grapple with-or even advert to-the difficult issues raised by the ADA claim.
Why did the federal courts move the proceedings so
quickly? As Herman Badillo said when state troopers stormed
Attica prison on September 13, 1971, "[t]here's always time to
die. I don't know what the rush was. "63 The federal courts would
not even have had to allow the litigation to follow the normal
timetable, with full discovery and a trial (a process the Eleventh
Circuit panel majority predicted would take "many months, if
not longer"64 ). The district court could have granted a brief TRO
and set a hearing a week or two later on a motion for a preliminary injunction. Such a brief delay would have given the district
court a chance to seriously think about the issues in the case. If,
after the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the court concluded that there really was no prospect of success, it could have
permitted Schiavo's feeding and hydration to be terminated
then. All that would have been lost was a couple of weeks.
But the district court did not grant even such a brief delay.
The explanation cannot be that the legal issues were obvious or
easy. I hope I have shown that they were not, though perhaps
the lawyers did not frame them in the manner that would have
been the most helpful to the Schindlers or the courts. Rather, the
most obvious explanation is that the federal judges assigned to
the case perceived the equities as strongly tilting in favor of ending the litigation as soon as possible. The state courts, after all,
had considered the case with extraordinary care-to the point of
bending over backwards to entertain and carefully review the
Schindlers' request to reopen the case and present new evidence.65 There was no particular reason to believe that the
63.
64.

65.

WICKER, A 11ME TO DIE 286 (1975) (quoting Badillo).
Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1226 n.4.
The Florida Circuit Court entered its original opinion directing the withholding
TOM
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Schindlers could present the federal courts with any probative
evidence or argument that the Florida courts had not exhaustively addressed. Given the history of the state-court litigation,
the words of the Florida trial judge must have weighed heavily
on the federal judges:
Five years have passed since the issuance of the February
2000 Order authorizing the removal of Theresa Schiavo's nutrition and hydration and there appears to be no finality in
sight to this process. The Court, therefore, is no longer comfortable in continuing to grant stays pending appeal of Orders
denying Respondents' various motions and petitions. The
process does not work when the trial court finds a motion to
be without merit but then stays the effect of such denial for
months pending appellate review. Also, the Court is no longer
comfortable granting stays simply upon the filing of new mo-

of feeding and hydration on February 11, 2000, after hearing evidence from the
Schindlers. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. a., Feb. 11,
2000). The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment, based on the record before the circuit court, on January 24, 2001. See Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.
2d at 180. On April 24, 2001, after the Florida Supreme Court denied discretionary review, Schiavo's feeding and hydration were discontinued. See In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. a. App. 2001). But the Schindlers filed a motion for
relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence two days later. See id. On July
11, 2001, the Florida Court of Appeals directed the trial court to entertain that motion
for relief from judgment, and it denied Michael Schiavo's motion to enforce its earlier
mandate. See id. at 554. The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment, but
the Florida Court of Appeals reversed. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640
(Fla. a. App. 2001). In an opinion entered on October 17, 2001, the appellate court expressed "skepticism" about the new evidence proffered by the Schindlers, id. at 644, but
it nonetheless held that the trial court must "permit certain limited discovery and conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the new evidence calls into question
the trial court's earlier decision," id. at 642. On remand, the trial court permitted discovery for almost a year and conducted a hearing at which it entertained testimony from six
physicians-Schiavo's treating physician, two experts chosen by Michael Schiavo, two
experts chosen by the Schindlers, and one expert chosen by the court-and reviewed additional documentary evidence. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2002 WL 31817960 at
*1 (Fla. Cir. a., Nov. 22, 2002). After exhaustively considering the new evidence, the
trial court refused to alter its original judgment. See id. at *2-*5. The Florida District
Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment on June 6, 2003. See In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 (Fla. a. App. 2003). Although the Florida appellate courts review the denial of a motion for relief from judgment for abuse of discretion, the Florida
District Court of Appeals "closely examined all of the evidence in th[e) record" and
"concluded that, if we were called upon to review the guardianship court's decision de
novo, we would still affirm it." Id. at 186. After the Florida Supreme Court invalidated,
on state constitutional grounds, a statute the legislature had adopted that permitted the
Governor to issue a stay of the order to terminate Schiavo's feeding and hydration, see
Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), the Schindlers filed a new motion for relief
from the original circuit court judgment, which the trial and appellate courts denied, see
In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814 (Fla. a. App. 2005).
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tions and petitions since there will always be "new" issues that
66
can be pled.

The Schindlers' federal court suit thus had all the hallmarks of
an eleventh-hour habeas petition filed by a death-row inmate, a
67
petition filed merely for delay, with no realistic hope of success.
And the fact that the ADA claim was not raised until the
Schindlers' amended complaint (albeit one filed only a day after
the original complaint) must have added to the sense of dilatoriness.
But however impressed the federal judges were with the
care and deliberation of the state courts-and however much
they thought the Schindlers filed their federal suit merely for delay-Congress specifically directed the federal courts to "determine de novo any claim of a violation of any right of Theresa
Marie Schiavo" and to do so "notwithstanding any prior State
court determination. "68 Respect for Congress thus required the
federal courts to decline to accord weight to the prior state court
proceedings.
The federal judges may not have felt terribly inclined to respect Congress in this case. The enactment of Public Law 109-3
does not appear as Congress's finest hour. The statute disregarded the results of the careful state-court proceedings and required extraordinary federal-court review of a single case without any particular reason to believe that the case was any
different from thousands of other cases that did not arouse congressional attention. Vocal advocates of the statute sought cynically to employ the Schiavos' and Schindlers' family tragedy as a
political weapon, an effort highlighted by the notorious "talking
points memorandum" that urged Republicans to use the Schiavo
case to gain partisan advantage.69 The race to enact the statute
also deprived Congress of any meaningful opportunity for deliberation.

In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2005 WL 459634 (Fla. Cir. a., Feb. 25, 2005).
Cf Mark Tushnet, "The King of France with Forty Thousand Men": Felker v.
Turpin and the Supreme Coun's Deliberative Processes, 1996 SUP. Cr. REv. 163, 166--81
(discussing pressures last-minute capital habeas petitions placed on Supreme Court decisionmaking processes during the 1980s and early 1990s). On the harm to judicial decisionmaking of a rush to judgment, see Michael Herz, The Supreme Coun in Real Time:
Haste, Waste, and Bush v. Gore, 35 AKRON L. REv. 185 (2002).
68. Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2.
69. See, e.g., Mike Allen, Counsel to GOP Senator Wrote Memo on Schiavo: Maninez Aide Who Cited Upside for Pany Resigns, WASH. POST., Apr. 7, 2005, at Al.
66.

67.
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Whether or not a law deserves respect as "good legislation,"
the courts have a duty to apply that law unless they conclude
that it is unconstitutional. Notably, neither the district judge nor
any of the three judges on the appellate panel assigned to the
case were willing to reach such a conclusion. Failing a determination that the statute was unconstitutional, the district court
and the appellate panel had an obligation to implement the statute's directive to consider matters de novo, without regard to
prior proceedings.
Only one federal judge was willing to conclude that Public
Law 109-3 was unconstitutional: Judge Birch, in his opinion concurring in the Eleventh Circuit's denial of en bane review.70 But
he was not a member of the panel that issued the appellate
court's judgment in the case. If the judges in the panel majority
believed the statute to be unconstitutional, candor compelled
71
them to say so. However, they said nothing on the subject.
I do not contend that the ultimate result in the Schiavo case
was wrong. My critique, rather, is a procedural one, one about
70. See Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1271-76 (Birch, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en
bane). Space limitations imposed by the editors prevent me from addressing Judge
Birch's argument that the statute was unconstitutional. For present purposes, it should
suffice to note that the issue is far more complex than Judge Birch suggested. Judge
Birch contended that Public Law 109-3 violated the separation of powers by singling out
a particular case and dictating various procedural rules to be applied in it-in particular,
by requiring de novo review and eliminating defenses based on preclusion, waiver, exhaustion, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 1273-75 & nn.4-5. But that argument stands in serious tension with the Supreme Court's decision in Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), which upheld a statute that singled out two pending cases by name and docket number and dictated substantive rules that would apply to
them, see id. at 434-35. The statute does resemble the colonial-era statutes in which legislatures singled out particular cases to "set aside the judgment and order a new trial or
appeal." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995). In Plaut, the Supreme
Court held that Article III of the Constitution responded to the abuses of that system by
prohibiting legislative interference with the final judgments of federal courts. See id. at
219-25. But Article III does not protect state-court judgments, and Plaut specifically reserved any due process issue. See id. at 217. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that,
notwithstanding Plaut, "[p)rospective relief under a continuing, executory decree remains subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying law." Miller v. French, 530
U.S. 327, 344 (2000). Under Florida law, the state-court order remained executory at the
time Congress enacted the statute. See GIUUdianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 559 ("As
long as the ward is alive, the order is subject to recall and is executory in nature."). This
is not to say that the statute was obviously constitutional; Judge Birch was correct that
the statute was "unprecedented in nature, and therefore a lack of controlling case law is
unremarkable." Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1274 n.4. But that very "lack of controlling case
law" should have inspired a bit more deliberation before racing to the conclusion that the
statute was obviously unconstitutional.
71. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv.
731, 738 (1987) (arguing that "a great deal is lost in the process of debate if the reasons
given by the judge to the public are inconsistent with those he would give in private, or to
himself').
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the role of a judge in a case like this. Respect for the decision of
a coordinate branch of government, and respect for the people
to whom that branch is ultimately responsible, required the federal courts to take one of two paths: either conducting the de
novo review Congress directed or forthrightly holding the statute
unconstitutional. The federal courts chose neither path, and that
is why I believe the Schiavo case is an occasion for regret.
III. CONCLUSION
Humility should prevent any of us from being too judgmental about the actions taken by the federal judges assigned to
the Schiavo case. The cliche is apt: The judges were thrust into
the center ring of a political and media circus. The judicial impulse to stand up to the political pressure applied by the
Schindlers and their allies in Congress and the right-to-life
movement must have been powerful. The impulse to defend the
work of the state courts-whose judges had been loudly and unjustly attacked for their rulings in the casen -must have been especially powerful. 73
The final days of Theresa Schiavo's life imposed what must
have been unbearable pressures on everyone involved. In the
face of such pressure, it is the rare person who can get by without doing anything he or she regrets. Unfortunately-or fortunately-judges are people, too. The federal judges assigned to
the Schiavo matter succumbed to the pressure to rush the case.
That they did so is understandable, but it is regrettable.

72 See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, In Courts, Threats Become Alarming Fact of Life,
N.Y. nMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at 1 ("George W. Greer, a state judge in Florida, has been the
target of considerable invective and the recipient of voluminous hate mail and death
threats for ordering the removal of a feeding tube from Ms. Schiavo. For weeks, sheriffs
deputies have kept Judge Greer under close guard.").
73. Also at work, I think, was the general disinclination of federal judges to hear
cases that feel like "family law" cases. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
615-16 (2000); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693-701 (1992). For criticism of
that disinclination, see, for example, Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269
(2000); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv.1682, 1749-50 (1991).

